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HECKSCHER-OHLIN  ThEORY A}D 
,ON-CONPETITIVE  MARKETS 
AACT 
This paper derives statements of the Heckscher—Ohlin  Theorem which 
remain valid In the presence  of market  power.  Following Helpman 
(1981a), the paper explores restrictions  on permissible  trade patterns 
that are Implied by the post—trade  equilibrium  conditions of Heckscher— 
Ohlin theory.  Restrictions on the patterns or commodity  trade are 
derived to complement  Helpman's factor content version or the 
competitive  Heckscher—Ohlin theory,  and the introduction  or factor 
market power is shown to leave the validity or these  restrictions 
unaffected.  Restrictions on the pattern or Heckscher—Ohlin trade in the 
presence of product market power are also derived, and conditions are 
stated under which Helpman's  competitive factor content restrictions 
continue to hold. 
Robert  U. Staiger 
Department  of Economics 
Stanford  University 
Stanford, CA  94305 I.  Introduction 
Efforts to generalize the predictions of the Heckscher—Ohlin (HO) 
model of international trade have received a great deal of attention in 
recent years.  A gen alization of the model to a world of many goods, 
factors, and countries, In which factor prices are not necessarily 
equalized or preferences i'ienttnl and  homothetic can be found in 
Deardorff  (1982).  These predictIons take the form of correlations among 
autarky factor prices, factor intensities, and multilateral trade in 
goods and, like the standard HO predictions, can be stated in either a 
commodity or a factor content version.  Such results are important in 
that they demonstrate the implications of what Is perhaps the 
fundamental assumption of HO theory——the international availability of 
technology——without many of the additional assumptions that have made 
the empirical relevance of the standard model suspect. 
One assumption that Is needed for Deardorff's results is that of 
perfectly competitive markets.  Especially in light of the 'owing 
interest in the causes and implications of international trade in the 
presence of various forms of non-competitive markets, a generalization 
of Deardorff's results to a world of non—competitive markets would be 
useful.  Unfortunately, such a generalization seems unlikely, at least 
until general gains—from-trade results in the presence of market power 
become available.  This is because, as emphasized by Deardorff (p. 688), 
the derivation of his results rely heavily on the existence of gains 
from trade.  Since a general gains—from—trade theorem in the presence of 
market power is not available, it is not clear how or even if —2— 
Deardorff's results can be generalized once the assumption of perfectly 
competItive markets Is dropped. 
While Deardorff's results provide general statements of the preclic— 
tive power of rky  factor prices for the pattern of trade, Helpman 
(981a) has derived restrictions on permissible trade patterns that are 
implied by the Oost-trade equilibrium conditions of HO theory,  The only 
assumptions recuired for his results, which relate bilateral post-trade 
factor price differentials to the factor content of bilateral trade, are 
that technologies are linearly homogeneous and available internation- 
ally, and that markets are compet1tive.!!  This paper adopts Helpoan's 
focus on the post—trade equilibrium conditions implied by the HO theory 
and explores the extent to which the implications of  .e fundamental 
technological assumptions of the HO model can be uncoupled from the 
assumption of competitive markets./  In particular, it will be shown 
that the HO restriction derived by Helpman  — that  one country will 
export to another the services of its relatively inexpensive factors 
remains valid in the presence of various forms of factor market power, 
and will be Invalidated by the existence of product market power only if 
the greatest relative exercise of domestic product market power tends to 
coincide with each nation's import—competing sectors. 
At a theoretical level, the resulting characterization of trade 
patterns In a HO world with non—competitive markets ought to be of 
Interest, since it provides a general statement of the way in which the 
international distribution of market power can influence the pattern of 
trade.  From the standpoint of testing the empirical relevance of the HO —3— 
model's assumptions, these restrictions are of Interest as well, since 
they represent testable implicatIons of the technological assumptions of 
the theory in combination with various characterizations of the degree 
of market competitiveneas.1 
Helpman's results are extended In two directions.  First, 
restrictions on  the  pattern  f nnmodty trade are derived to complement 
Helpnan's factor content versiDn of the competitive HO theory, and the 
Introduction of factor market power is shown to leave the validity of 
these restrictions unaffected.  This result is contained in section  II. 
Next, the Introduction of Imperfectly competitive product markets leads 
to a simple and Intuitive generalization of Helpman's conditions to a 
world with product market power.  Restrictions on the pattern of product 
market power which leave Helpman's conditions unaltered are also 
considered.  This is the subject of section III.  Finally, section IV 
provides a concluding discussion and a brief comment on the implications 
of scale  economies  for the results of  this paper. 
It.  Non—Copet1tive  Factor Markets 
While Helpman relies on properties of the ag'egate GOP function 
to derive his factor content results, restrictions on the commodity 
composition of trade are derived more transparently  following the 
nonparanetric approach of Varian (1984).  However, intuition In a two— 
factor two—country world can be provided by the Lerner-Pearce diagram 
familiar from Heckscher-Ohlin theory.  The diagram is depicted in Figure 
1  .  Unit isocost lines summarize the combinations of capital and labor *
1that can be hired for one dollar at factor prices  (w,r)  and  (w*,r*) 
in the home and foreign country, respectively.  The unit value isoquant 
labeled  x — 1/Pt  gives the combinations of capital and labor 
sufficient to produce one dollar's wortb of  x  at price  P.  The ray 
from the origin through the  point of intersection of the two unit 
isocost lines has slope  =w  - w*)/(r* — r).  The slope of this ray  is 
significant because, under perfect competitton, any good produced in 
equilibrium in the home country must employ capital and labor in a ratio 
greater than  ,  while any good produced in equilibrium abroad must 
employ capital and labor in a ratio lower than  k. 
Thus, if good  x  is exported from the home to the foreign country, 
it must be produced domestically and, as depicted by the unit value 
Isoquant for  x  in Figure , the ratio of capital to labor employed  in 
the domestic production of  x  must satisfy  K/L 
> (w — w*)!(r*  — r), 
or  [(w* r*)  — (w r)] L  > 0. 
K  x 
Proposition I below provides a straightforward generalization of this 
restriction to  M  factors and sector—specific factor prices. 
In particular, consider any commodity  rt  exported from country 
j  to country  i.  If the technology in this sector is linearly 
homogeneous and firms minimize cost taking factor proes parametrically, 
then unit costs of production for  good  n  in country  j  will be given 
by  wa 
where  w  is a  (1  x M)  vector of post-trade factor prices 
in country  j's  sector  n,  and  a 
is a  (M x 1)  vector of cost— 
minimizing unit factor requirements used in the production of  n  in —5- 
country  ..!f  Note that the assumption of parametric factor prices rules 
out monopsony but is consistent with an economy-wide minimum wage (as in 
Brecher,  1971;)  and with factor market imperfections whioh lead to 
intersectoral factor price differentials (as, for example, in tiagee, 
1971). 
Commodity  n  is by assumption exported from  3  to  i,  so that if 
producers are perfectly competitive, and if subsidies to the export of 
good  n  from  3  do not exceed transport costs and tariffs on imports 
of  n  into  i,  then the unit cost of producing  n  can be no less in 
i  thanin 3.  That  is, 
wa>wa 
where w and  a  are, except for the country superscript, defined 
analogously to  and  a.  Condition  (1)  must hold whether or not 
n  is actually produced in country  i.  Finally, if technology in 
sector  n  is internationally available, then  a  represents a feasible 
production technique in country  i,  and cost minimization  implies 
wa ) wa 
Combining (1) and (2), defining  as rose  exports of comeodity  n 
from  3  to  i,  and  making  a syimuetric  argument with  respect to exports 
from  i  to  J, T,  yields 
Proposition Is  If perfectly competitive producers  in sector  n  with  no —6— 
monopsony  power  cost  minimize  subject  to  a linearly homogeneous produc- 
tion technology common to both countries  I  and  j,  then,  provided 
subsidies are not so large as to outweigh transportation costs and 
import tariffs, the conmodity pattern of bilateral trade must satisfy 
- wia  > 0  for  all  n  such that  > 0 
[w  - wt]ai  > 0  for all  n  such that  T31 > 0 
n  n  n—  n 
Condition  (3) provides  restrictions on the pattern of bilateral 
commodity trade that must be satisfied by post-trade observations 
consistent with the general HO theory embodied  in the assumptions of 
Proposition I.  The condition says simply that the bundle of factors 
embodied in a unit of any good produced for export must be no more 
expensive to purchase In the exporting country in the post—trade 
equilibrium than it would be in the importing country.  An alternative 
interpretation of Proposition I  can be obtained by transforming (3) into 
a relationship between percentage bilateral factor price differentials 
and factor intensities.  Define  as a  (M x 1)  vector of factor 
intensities in country  j's  sector  n  with mth element given by 




nm  nm 
m 
and define  as a  (1 x M)  vector of percentage bilateral factor 
price differentials  in sector  n  with mth element given by - 
iJ  rim  rim 




Then condition (3) can be rewritten as 
> 0  for all  n  such that  T3  > 0 
n  n  n 
> 0  for all  ri  such that  T31 )  0 
where w  and  e1  are defined analogously to  and  e.  The  n  n  fl  fl 
Interpretation  associated with () is that every export good 15,  In an 
average sense, intensive in factors that are relatively inexpensive in 
the exporting country in the post—trade equilibrium.  This provides a 
generalization of the results of Jones (1956—57) and Bhagwati (1972) 
derived in a competitive two-factor world:  that every good exported by 
the capital-abundant country must  have a greater capital/labor ratio 
than every  good exported by the labor-abundant country. 
Helpman's factor content version of these restrictions can be 
derived immediately from  (3) by assuming the absence of Intersectoral 
factor 'rice differentials.  Dropping the Industry subscrIpts on the 
factor price vectors, multiplying the two parts of (3)  by the scalars 
T1  and  T1,  respectively, and summing over all  n  yields Helprnan's 
condition 
— w]f1  > 
where  fIJ,  the  (1  x M)  vector of the factor content of' net exports -8- 




Hence, under the ass  tfon of competitive  product markets, and 
ruling out monopsony and  Intorsectoral  factor price differentials, con- 
ditions  (3) and  (5) provide commodity and factor content versions of a 
very general HO theory.  And in the presence of factor market imperfec- 
tions which give rise to intersectoral factor price differentials, con- 
dition (3)  provides valid HO restrictions on the commodity pattern of 
tnternatlonal trade. 
III.  Non—CompetitiVe Product Markets 
Melvin  and Warne (1973) introduced  monopoly  into the 2x2 HO model 
symmetrically, so that the equilibrium markup of price above cost in 
any sector was identical in the two countries, and showed that in this 
case the standard HO trade patterns continue to emerge from the model. 
However, relaxation of this symmetry property can lead to a reversal of 
the pattern of trade from that expected under competitive HO theory, as 
noted for example in Helprnan (198kb).  International differences in the 
degree of product market competitiveness can also Invalidate condition 
(3)  of Proposition  I.  That is,  define the markup of producer prices 
above marginal  cost--the Lerner index of market power--for good  n 
produced In country  j  and sold in country  i,  m, 
as —9— 
lj  j j 
p  -wa  i  r  n n  m 
p 
where  p  Is the  price received by producers In country  j  if good 
n  is sold in country  I.  Since this markup may differ dependIng on the 
location of the producer and the market beIng served,  define  mU, 
and  m  analogously to 
Now suppose that,  in the post-trade equilibrium, country  i  is 
observed to be importing good  n  from country  j  and that 
— WJ a  <  U  in vIolation of  (3).  However, suppose it IS also 
observed that  m11 > m1  .  In  this case one cannot rule out the 
possibilIty that technologies are Indeed Identical but that the 
relatively high markup of  l's  producers for the sale of good  n  in 
the domestic market has induced imports of  n  from  j  to  I  that 
would not be profitable if producers in country  1  prIced 
competitively,  This suggests the modification of the conditions of 
Proposition I to Include a bilateral markup comparison in the importing 
country's market. 
A more precise Intuition can be provided by the two—factor Lerner- 
Pearce diagram of FIgure 2.  Suppose that good  x  is observed  to be 
exported from the foreign to the home country, but that Its capital 
intensity in the foreign production process  K/L 
Is greater than 
(w — w*)/(r*  — r).  Could this be consistent with equilibrium behavior 
given identical technologies at home and abroad?  Not with perfectly 
competitive goods markets, since positive profits would be earned by 















given the assumptions of identical technolog1es  cost—minimizat1on  and 
perfect competition in the foregfl product market, the domestic markup 
of price  above cost implicit in Figure 2  is given by  bc/Oc.  Hence, 
whether or not the observation  that the  foreign country  exports  x  is 
to be interpreted as evidence against  the HO  presumption of 
internationally identical technologies depends in a precise way upon 
whether and to what degree the equilibrium  markup in sector  x  differs 
across countries.  Proposition II formalizes this intuition. 
Proposition II:  If producers of good  n  in countries  i  and  j  lack 
monopsony power and minimize costs subject to linearly homogeneous 
production technologies common to both countries, then, provided 
subsidies are not so large as to outweigh transport costs and Import 
tariffs, the following conditions must hold: 
Cu1  - w]v  +  Cm11  - m13  )  0  for all  n  such that  > 0  n  nn  n  n  —  n 
(6) 
- w1Jv1 +  - m'J  >  0  for  all  n  such that  > 0  n  n  n  ii  n  —  n 
where  v  Is a  (M x  1)  vector of cost-minimizing factor requirements 
in country  .5  for the unit value production of good  n,  —j—,  defined 
by 
a 
.5  n  V  — 
n  15 —Il— 
and  v Is defined analogously. 
Proof:  Since  pU  and  p  are prices received for the sale of good 
o  in country  i  by producers of  n  in countries  I  and  j, 
respectively, the assumption on the relative sizes of transport costs, 




Using the definition of  ph  can be rewritten in terms of 
and unit costs of production and substituted into (7) to yield 
ii  liii  w a  —  Cl—rn  )p  > 0  nn  n  n  — 
Cost  minimization and the international availability of technology 
implies that  a can be replaced by  a 
without violating (8)  to yield 
— (l_rnui)pii  > Q  no  n  n  — 
Using  the definition of  wa 
can be written as  (l—m)p,  so 
that subtracting and adding  wa 
to (9) yields 
Ewa 
— wa) — [(1—m1)p 
— (1-m)p) 
> 0 
Finally, dividing (O) through by  p, simplifying, and making a 
symmetric argument with respect to exports from  i  to  j,  yields (6), 
which completes the proof. —12— 
Proposition II provides a simple generalization of the commodity 
statement of the HO theory contained in PropositIon I by allowing for 
non—competitive product markets——in addition to imperfect factor 
markets——as captured by bilateral  post—trade equilibrium markup differ— 
entIals,  The condition illustrates the precise way in which the pattern 
of product market power across countries, as captured by international 
variations in the Lerner index,  can affect the pattern of commodity 
trade in a  HO  world.  A sense of'  how factor intensities  and product 
market power combine to determine the pattern of commodity trade can be 
gained by defining a second measure of factor Intensity,  a 
x 1)  vector with mth element given by 
wa 
—  rm  nm 
Vnm  ij 
pn 
With  and  defined as before, and with  defined 




> 0  for all  n  such that  > 0 
(11) 
+ Em 
- m1]  > 0  for all  n  such that  T 
>  o 
Condition  (H) says that, controlling for bilateral differences in 
market power, every export good must, in an average sense, be intensIve 
in those factors that are relatively inexpensive in the exporting 
country in the post—trade equilibrium.  But the conditIon makes precise —13— 
the way In which bilateral differences in the exercise of market power 
can diminish the importance of factor intensities in determining the 
pattern of commodity trade.  That is, with respect to the importing 
country's market for  ,  the  eater is the markup of import-competing 
producers relative to producers  abroad, the smaller will be the role 
played by  factor  intensities in determining  the commodity pattern of 
trade. 
Ruling out  Intersectoral  factor  price differentials leads to a 
generalization  of Helpman's factor content statement in the presence of 
product  market power.  This is Proposition III. 
Proposition III:  If the assumptions of Proposition LI hold and in 
addition, there are no intersectoral factor price differentials, then 
rwt  — w]f + :Mt  — MJr1  > 0 
where  Mi  is a  (1  x N)  vector with th  element  for  n  such 
that  T  >  0  and  rn1  for  n  such that  > 0,  M  is a 
(1  N  vector with th  element  for  such that  T1  > 0  and 
for  n  such that  TJi >  0,  and  is a  (N x  1)  vector with 
th  element  representing the value of net exports of  n  fron  j 
to  I,  valued at export prices, or 
pT 
- —1 — 
Proof:  The results follow immediately from PropositIon II by  droppIng 
the  n  subscripts on the factor price vectors, multiplying the two 
parts of (6) by  p1T1  and  p1T1  respectively,  and summing over 
all  n. 
Proposition III  Implies that the existence of product market power 
will not invalidate Helpman's factor content version of the HO theory  as 
contained in (5) as  long as b1lateral differences in product market 
power are non  negatively related to sectoral export performance.  This 
is the statement at the following Corollary. 
Corollary:  If the assumptions of Proposition 111 hold and, in addition, 
bilateral trade is balanced at export prices, then the existence of 
product market power will leave intact Helpman's factor content 
restrictions provIded that bilateral differences in market power and 
bilateral export performance are non negatively correlated across 
sectors in the sense that 
CorEM  - M1, T1]  >  0 
Proof:  The result follows from Proposition III and the assumption of 
balanced bilateral trade at export prices, which ensures that the sign 
of the correlation between  - M1]  and  is the same as the sign 
of the corresponding inner product. 
A simple example of a particular market structure that would 
satisfy the restrictions of (13) is provided by the Cournot—Nash —15— 
equilibrium of an m—firm oligopoly, with m/2 firms operating in each of 
the two countries of a two-country world.  Suppose that firms in the 
oligopoly sector have incurred some sunk cost and produce at constant 
marginal cost, all other sectors in the two countries behaving 
competitively.  In the absence of impediments to trade, the equilibrium 
(world) market share of each of the m firms will depend on Its marginal 
costs.  In particular, If at post—trade equilibrium factor prices the 
cost of production in the oligopoly sector differs in the two countries, 
the m/2 firms operating in the lower cost country will have relatively 
high markups, and will individually and as a group capture a larger 
share of the  (world) market than the m/2 firms operating in the high 
cost country.  If demand for the good is divided equally over the two 
countries, then the country with high—markup firms will be a net 
exporter of the good.  With this the only non—competitive sector by 
assumption, condition  (13) wIll be satisfied, and Helpman's factor 
content restrictions will remain valid. 
Condition  (13)  is an equilibrium restriction on the interaction 
between the pattern and degree of product market power and the pattern 
of commodity trade which,  It'  satisfied, will ensure that the existence 
of product market power does not invalidate the implications of the 
competitive HO theory as derived by Helpman.  While various market 
structures may satisfy (13) and thus leave in tact the implications of 
the competitive HO theory, whether (13) is in fact satist'ied  is largely 
an empirical question.  As such,  this corollary points to the Importance 
of intormatlon on the empirical relationship between market power and —16— 
sectoral trade performance in attempting to gauge the degree to which 
the competitive HO theory will fall short in characterizing observed 
patterns of'  trade (or the factor content  of' trade).  In that sense, 
condition (13)  provides the theoretical basis for an empirical 
exploration of the taportance of' non—competitive trade theories in 
accounting for the empirical shortcomings of the competitive HO model. 
IV.  Discussion 
ThIs  paper  has explored the possibility of developing general 
restricttons on the pattern of International trade implied by a model 
which assumes the existence of internationally available technologies 
and little else.  In particular, restrictions Implied by HO theory have 
been derived which remain valid in a world consIsting of' arbitrary 
numbers of goods, factors, and ountries characterized by the existence 
of'  market power In factor and product markets, trade impediments, 
unequal factor prices, and preferences which are neither identical nor 
homothetic. 
The results of' this paper provide clear statements of the way in 
which post—trade factor prices, factor Intensities, and market power 
combine to characterize the pattern of trade.  In partIcular, the tradi- 
tional HO emphasis on factor intensities as a guide to the pattern of 
trade remains appropriate in the presence of factor market distortions, 
provided that post—trade equilibrium conditions are used to characterize 
HO trade patterns.  However, the focus on factor intensities will be 
misguided in this context if the international distribution of' relatIve —17— 
produot market power is related inversely to export performanoex  that 
is  if the greatest relative exeroise of dcmestio product market power 
tends  to coincide with a nation's import—competing seotors. 
Finally,  it s'iould be noted that the  asswuption of linearly 
homogeneous technologies maictai'ed throughout this paper can  be relaxed 
somewhat withoit invalidating  any cf the restCts.  In particilar, the 
above  restrictions "iust be ret by eqailibrisn trade patterns in the 
presenoe of increasing retarrs  provided that the minimun efficient sale 
of operation in the exporting count"y's sector  n  is no larger than the 
amount of bilateral exports of good  ni'  Thus what is required is that 
a single prodacer'  s scale economies  in the exporting country would be 
exhausted if it alone were to roduce the bilateral export  bundle of 
good  n.  While this Units the degree of scC.e economies, it r.everthe— 
less allows a degree of increasing retirns that could conceivaoly give 
rise to substantial  degrees  of product market power. Footnotes 
Though Helpman (198a) points out that his conditions remain valid 
in the specIal case of symmetric differentiated product equilibria 
where the scale of operation of firms in any industry is the same 
across countries. 
2/  While factor market imperfections may exist independently of scale 
economies In production,  It is natural for  a relaxation of the 
constant-returns—toscale  assumption to accompany the relaxation of 
perfectly  competitIve product markets.  The assumptIon of lInear 
homogeneity  is maintained throughout the formal analysis, but 
section  IV notes how scale economies that give rise  to product 
market power can be introduced without invalidating any of the 
results. 
1"  The  need  for  such  conditions  has  been  emphasized  by  Krueger  (1983, 
p. 80). 
Helpman assumes the absence of Intermediate inputs into production, 
and the same assumptIon will be made throughout this paper. 
However, all the results of this paper can be shown to hold in a 
world  with traded intermediate goods as long as there are no 
Intermediate good tariffs or transport costs, and provided that the 
factor  content of trade is measured on a direct basis, i.e., 
excluding the factor content of intermediate inputs.  For a 
discussion of the role of intermediate goods, see Staiger (1986). 
In this case, the factor content of country  j's  exports of good 
n  can  be  calculated as  the quantity of exports multIplIed  by the 
average factor content  of  one unit of good  n  produced In 
country  j.  Similarly, industry markups can be interpreted as the 
markup of price above average cost, and would thus continue to 
represent unit economic  profits.  The condItions  in this paper 
would then allow observed data to be checked for consistency with 
the equilibrium conditions of HO theory in the presence of such 
scale economies. -19— 
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